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Abstract
Distributed machine learning algorithms play a significant role in processing massive data sets over
large networks. However, the increasing reliance on machine learning on information and communication
technologies (ICTs) makes it inherently vulnerable to cyber threats. This work aims to develop secure
distributed algorithms to protect the learning from data poisoning and network attacks. We establish
a game-theoretic framework to capture the conflicting goals of a learner who uses distributed support
vector machines (SVMs) and an attacker who is capable of modifying training data and labels. We
develop a fully distributed and iterative algorithm to capture real-time reactions of the learner at each
node to adversarial behaviors. The numerical results show that distributed SVM is prone to fail in
different types of attacks, and their impact has a strong dependence on the network structure and attack
capabilities.
Index Terms
Adversarial distributed machine learning Game theory Distributed support vector machines Label-
flipping attack Data-poisoning attack Network-type attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, parallel and distributed machine learning (ML) algorithms have been developed
to scale up computations in large datasets and networked systems [1], such as distributed
spam filtering [2] and distributed traffic control [3]. However, they are inherently vulnerable to
adversaries who can exploit them. For instance, nodes of distributed spam filter system can fail
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2to detect spam email messages after an attacker modifies the training data [4], or disrupts the
network services using denial-of-service attacks [5].
ML algorithms are often open-source tools and security is usually not the primary concerns
of their designers. It is undemanding for an adversary to acquire the complete information of
the algorithm, and exploits its vulnerabilities. Also, the growing reliance of ML algorithms
on off-the-shelf information and communication technologies (ICTs) such as cloud computing
and the wireless networks [6] has made it even easier for adversaries to exploit the existing
known vulnerabilities of ICTs to achieve their goals. Security becomes a more critical issue in
the paradigm of distributed ML, since the learning consists of a large number of nodes that
communicate using ICTs, and its attack surface grows tremendously compared to its centralized
counterpart.
Hence, it is imperative to design secure distributed ML algorithms against cyber threats. Current
research endeavors have focused on two distinct directions. One is to develop robust algorithms
despite uncertainties in the dataset [7]–[9]. The second one is to improve detection and prevention
techniques to defend against cyber threats, e.g., [10]–[12]. These approaches have mainly focused
on centralized ML and computer networks, separately. The investigation of security issues in the
distributed ML over networks is lacking.
The challenges of developing secure distributed machine learning arise from the complexity
of the adversarial behaviors and the network effects of the distributed system. The attacker’s
strategies can be multi-stage. For instance, he can reach his target to modify training data
by launching multiple successful network attacks. Furthermore, the impact of an attack can
propagate over the network. Uncompromised nodes can be affected by the misinformation from
compromised nodes, leading to a cascading effect.
Traditional detection and defense strategies for centralized ML and networked systems are not
sufficient to protect the distributed ML systems from attacks. To bridge this gap, this work aims
to develop a game-theoretic framework to model the interactions of an attacker and a defender to
assess and design security strategies in distributed systems. Game theory has been used to address
the security issues in centralized ML, e.g., [13], [14], and those in computer networks [15]–[17]
and cyber-physical networks [18]–[21]. The proposed game-theoretic model captures the network
structures of the distributed system and leads to fully distributed and iterative algorithms that
can be implemented at each node as defense strategies.
In particular, we use game models to study the impact on consensus-based distributed support
3vector machines (DSVMs) of an attacker who is capable of modifying training data and labels. In
[22]–[24], we have built a game-theoretic framework to investigate the impacts of data poisoning
attacks to DSVMs, we have further proposed four defense methods and verified their effectiveness
with numerical experiments in [25]. In [26], we have proposed a game-theoretic framework to
model the interactions between a DSVM learner and an attacker who can modify the training
labels.
In this paper, we extend our previous works by studying a broad range of attack models and
classify them into two types. One is ML attacks, which exploit the vulnerabilities of ML algorithm,
and the other one is Net-attacks, which arise from the vulnerabilities of the communication
network. We then build the game-theoretic minimax problem to capture the competition between a
DSVM learner and an attacker who can modify training data and labels. With alternating direction
method of multipliers (ADMM) [27]–[29], we develop a fully distributed iterative algorithms
where each compromised node operates its own sub-max-problem for the attacker and sub-min-
problem for the learner. The game between a DSVM learner and an attacker can be viewed as a
collection of small sub-games associated with compromised nodes. This unique structure enables
the analysis of per-node-behaviors and the transmission of misleading information under the
game framework.
Numerical results on Spambase data set [30] are provided to illustrate the impact of different
attack models by the attacker. We find that network plays a significant role in the security of
DSVM, a balanced network with fewer nodes and higher degrees are less prone to attackers who
can control the whole system. We also find that nodes with higher degrees are more vulnerable.
The distributed ML systems are found to be prone to network attacks even though the attacker
only adds small noise to information transmitted between neighboring nodes. A summary of
notations in this paper is provided in the following table.
Summary of Notations
V , v, Bv Set of Nodes, Node v, Set of Neighboring Nodes of Node v
wv, bv, rv Decision Variables at Node v
xvn, yvn n-th Data and Label at Node v
Xv, Yv Data Matrix and Label Matrix at Node v
ωvu Consensus Variable between Node v and Node u
θv Indicator Vector of Flipped Labels at Node v
δvn Vector of Data Poisoning on the n-th Data at Node v
4II. PRELIMINARY
Consider a distributed linear support vector machines learner in the network with V = {1, ..,V}
representing the set of nodes. Node v ∈ V only communicates with his neighboring nodes
Bv ⊆ V . Note that without loss of generality, any two nodes in this network are connected by
a path, i.e., there is no isolated node in this network. At every node v, a labelled training set
Dv = {(xvn,yvn)}Nvn=1 of size Nv is available. The goal of the learner is to find a maximum-margin
linear discriminant function gv(x) = xT w∗v +bv∗ at every node v ∈ V based on its local training
set Dv. Consensus constraints w∗1 = w
∗
2 = ... = w
∗
V ,b
∗
1 = b
∗
2 = ... = b
∗
V are used to force all local
decision variables {w∗v ,b∗v} to agree across neighboring nodes. This approach enables each node
to classify any new input x to one of the two classes {+1,−1} without communicating Dv to
other nodes v′ 6= v. The discriminant function gv(x) can be obtained by solving the following
optimization problem:
min
{wv,bv}
1
2 ∑
v∈V
‖ wv ‖2 +VCl ∑
v∈V
Nv
∑
n=1
[
1− yvn(wTv xvn+bv)
]
+
s.t. wv = wu,bv = bu, ∀v ∈ V ,u ∈Bv.
(1)
In the above problem, the term
[
1− yvn(wTv xvn+bv)
]
+
:= max
[
0,1− yvn(wTv xvn+bv)
]
is the
hinge loss function, Cl is a tunable positive scalar for the learner. To solve Problem (1), we first
define rv := [wTv ,bv]T , the augmented matrix Xv := [(xv1, ...,xvNv)T ,1v], and the diagonal label
matrix Yv := diag([yv1, ...,yvNv]). With these definitions, it follows readily that wv = Îp×(p+1)rv,
Îp×(p+1) = [Ip×p,0p×1] is a p× (p+1) matrix with its first p columns being an identity matrix,
and its (p+1) column being a zero vector. Thus, Problem (1) can be rewritten as
min
{rv,ωvu}
1
2 ∑
v∈V
rTv Πp+1rv+VCl ∑
v∈V
1Tv {1v−YvXvrv}+
s.t. rv = ωvu,ωvn = ru, v ∈ V ,u ∈Bv,
(2)
where the consensus variable ωvu is used to decompose the decision variable rv to its neighbors ru.
Note that Πp+1 = ÎTp×(p+1)Îp×(p+1) is a (p+1)× (p+1) identity matrix with its (p+1, p+1)-st
entry being 0. The term {1v−YvXvrv}+ := max [0v,1v−YvXvrv], which returns a vector of size
Nv. The algorithm of solving Problem (1) can be shown as the following lemma from Proposition
1 in [31].
Lemma 1. With arbitrary initialization r(0)v ,λ
(0)
v and α
(0)
v = 0(p+1)×1, the iterations per node
are:
λ (t+1)v ∈ arg max
0≤λv≤VCl1v
−12λTv YvXvU−1v XTv Yvλv+(1v+YvXvU−1v f
(t)
v )
T
λv, (3)
5Fig. 1. DSVM example. At every iteration, each node v first computes λv and rv by (3) and (4). Then, each node sends its rv to
its neighboring nodes. After that, each node computes αv using (5). Iterations continue until convergence.
r(t+1)v = U−1v
(
XTv Yvλ
(t+1)
v − f(t)v
)
, (4)
α(t+1)v = α
(t)
v +
η
2 ∑u∈Bv
[
r(t+1)v − r(t+1)u
]
, (5)
where Uv =Πp+1+2η |Bv|Ip+1, f(t)v = 2α(t)v −η∑u∈Bv(r(t)v + r(t)u ).
Note that ωvu has been solved directly and plugged into each equations. λv and αv are Lagrange
multipliers. The ADMM-DSVM algorithm is illustrated in Figure 1. Note that at any given
iteration t of the algorithm, each node v ∈ V computes its own local discriminant function g(t)v (x)
for any vector x as g(t)v (x) = [xT ,1]r
(t)
v . Since we only need the decision variables rv for the
discriminant function, we use the DSVMv as a short-hand notation to represent iterations (3)-(5)
at node v:
r(t+1)v ∈ DSVMv
(
Xv,Yv,r
(t)
v ,{r(t)u }u∈Bv
)
. (6)
The iterations stated in Lemma 1 are referred to as ADMM-DSVM. It is a fully decentralized
network operation. Each node v only shares decision variables rv to his neighboring nodes
u∈Bv. Other DSVM approaches include distributed chunking SVMs [32] and distributed parallel
SVMs [33], where support vectors (SVs) are exchanged between each nodes, and distributed
semiparametric SVMs, where the centroids of local SVMs are exchanged among neighboring
nodes [32]. In comparison, ADMM-DSVM has no restrictions on the network topology or the type
6of data, and thus, we use it as an example to illustrate the impact of the attacker on distributed
learning algorithms.
III. ATTACK MODELS AND RELATED WORKS
In this section, we summarize and analyze possible attack models from the attacker. We start
by identifying the attacker’s goal and his knowledge. Based on the three critical characteristics
of information, the attacker’s goal can be captured as damageing the confidentiality, integrity
and availability of the systems [34]. Damaging confidentiality indicates that the attacker intends
to acquire private information. Damaging integrity means that the data or the models used by
the learner are modified or replaced by the attacker, which can not represent real information
anymore. Damaging availability indicates that the attacker, which is an unauthorized user, uses
the information or services provided by the learner. In this paper, we assume that the attacker
intends to damage the integrity of the distributed ML systems by modifying either the data or
the models of the learner.
The impacts of the attacker are affected by the attacker’s knowledge of the learner’s systems.
For example, an attacker may only know the data used by the learner, but he does not know the
algorithm the learner use; or he may only know some nodes of the network. To fully capture
the damages caused by the attacker, in this paper, we assume that the attacker has a complete
knowledge of the learner, i.e., the attacker knows the learner’s data and algorithm and the network
topology.
The attack models on distributed ML learner can be summarized into two main categories.
One is the machine learning type attacks (ML-attacks) [35], the other one is the network type
attacks (Net-attacks) [36]. In the ML-attacks, the attacker can exploit machine learning systems
which produces classification or prediction errors. In the Net-attacks, an adversary attacks a
networked system to compromise the security of this system by actions, which leads to the leak
of private information or the failure of operations in this network. In this paper, we further divide
ML-attacks into two sub-categories, training attacks and testing attacks. Note that the attack
models described here are generally applicable to different machine learning algorithms. The
focus of this work is to investigate the impact of these attack models on DSVM, which provides
fundamental insights on the inherent vulnerability of distributed machine learning.
7A. Training Attacks
In the training attacks, an adversary attacks the learner at the time when the learner solves
Problem (1). In these attacks, communications in the network may lead to unanticipated
results as misleading information from compromised nodes can be spread to and then used by
uncompromised nodes. One challenge of analyzing training attacks is that the consequences of
attacker’s actions may not be directly visible. For example, assuming that the attacker modifies
some training data xvn in node v, the learner may not be able to find out which data has been
modified, and furthermore, in distributed settings, the learner may not even be able to detect
which nodes are under attack. We further divide training attacks into three categories based on
the scope of modifications made by the attacker.
1) Training Labels Attacks: In this category, the attacker can modify the training labels
{yvn}n=1,...,Nv , where v ∈ Va. After training data with flipped labels, the discriminant functions
will be prone to give wrong labels to the testing data. In early works [37], [38], centralized SVMs
under training label attacks have been studied, and robust SVMs have been brought up to reduce
the effects of such attacks. In this work, we further extend such attack models to distributed
SVM algorithms, and we use game theory to model the interactions between the DSVM learner
and the attacker. We verify the effects of the attacker with numerical experiments.
2) Training Data Attacks: In this category, the attacker modifies the training data {xvn}n=1,...,Nv
on compromised nodes v ∈ Va. Since the training and testing data are assumed to be generated
from the same distribution, the discriminant function found with training data on distribution X
can be used to classify testing data from the same distribution X . However, after modifying
training data xvn into x̂vn, which belongs to a different distribution X̂ , the discriminant function
with training such crafted data is suitable to classify data of distribution X̂ . Thus, the testing
data x ∈X are prone to be misclassified with this discriminant function.
The attacker can delete or craft several features [8], [9], change the training data of one class
[39], add noise to training data [40], change the distributions of training data [13], inject crafted
data [41], and so on. However, these works aim at centralized machine learning algorithms.
In distributed algorithms, the information transmissions between neighboring nodes can make
uncompromised nodes to misclassify testing data after training with information from compromised
nodes. In [23], an attacker aims at reducing a DSVM learner’s classification accuracy by changing
training data xvn in node v ∈ Va into x̂vn := xvn−δvn. This work shows that the performances of
8DSVM under adversarial environments are highly dependent on network topologies.
3) Training Models Attacks: The DSVM learner aims to find the discriminant function with
the lowest risks by solving Problem (1) with local training sets Dv. However, the attacker may
change Problem (1) into a different problem or he can modify parameters in Problem (1). For
example, when the attacker changes Cl in Problem (1) into 0, the learner can only find wv = 0,
which does not depend on the distribution of training data, and thus, the learner will misclassify
input testing data in the same distribution.
With training attacks, the DSVM leaner will find wrong decision variables ŵ∗v and b̂∗v in
compromised node v ∈ Va. However, the consensus constraints w∗1 = w∗2 = ... = w∗V ,b∗1 = b∗2 =
...= b∗V force all the decision variables to agree on each other. Hence uncompromised nodes with
correct decision variables will be affected by misleading decision variables from compromised
nodes. As a result, the training process in the network can be damaged even the attacker only
attacks a small number of nodes.
B. Testing Attacks
In testing attacks, the attacker attacks at the time when the DSVM learner labels new input
x into +1 or −1 with w∗v and b∗v from the solved Problem (1). The attacker can conduct three
different operations in testing attacks.
Firstly, the attacker can directly change the given label y of the testing data x into −y, and
thus a wrong label is generated with this operation. Secondly, the attacker can replace the testing
data x with crafted x̂, or he can modify that into x̂ = x− δ [42]. In such cases, the learner
gives the label of x̂ rather than the label of x, which leads to misclassification. Thirdly, the
attacker can modify or replace w∗v and b∗v into ŵ∗v and b̂∗v , and thus the compromised discriminant
function ĝv(x) = xT ŵ∗v + b̂∗v will yield wrong results. A simple example is that the attacker can
set ŵ∗v =−w∗v and b̂∗v =−b∗v , thus ĝv(x) =−gv(x), which leads to contrary predictions.
Testing attacks can cause disastrous consequences in centralized machine learning algorithms
as there is only one discriminant function. However, Testing attacks are weak in distributed
machine learning algorithms as uncompromised nodes can still give correct predictions, and
compromised nodes can be easily detected as they have higher classification risks.
9(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 2. Network attacks examples. (a) No attack. The learner uses a fully connected network with 3 nodes. (b) Node capture
attacks. The attacker controls Node 1 and make modifications on it. (c) Sybil attacks. Two red malicious nodes are generated by
the attacker and pretend that they are in the training network. (d) MITM attacks. The attacker creates adversarial nodes (depicted
in red) and pretend to be the other nodes on the connections.
C. Network Attacks
Network attacks can pose a significant threat with potentially severe consequences on networked
systems [36]. Since distributed machine learning algorithms have been developed to solve large-
scale problems using networked systems [31], network attacks can also cause damages on
distributed learning systems. Network attacks include node capture attacks, Sybil attacks, and
Man-In-The-Middle attacks, which are illustrated in Figure 2.
In node capture attacks (Figure 2(b)), an attacker gains access into the network, and controls
a set of nodes, then he can alter both software programming and hardware configuration, and
influence the outcome of network protocols [43]. When the attacker conducts node capture
attacks on a DSVM learner, he can modify either the data in the compromised nodes, or the
algorithms of the learner. Both of the modifications can lead to misclassifications in compromised
nodes. Moreover, the attacker can also send misleading information through network connections
between neighboring nodes, thus even uncompromised nodes can be affected by the attacker.
In Sybil attacks (Figure 2(c)), the attacker can create an adversarial node in the middle of a
connection, and talk to both nodes and pretends to be the other node [44]. If such attacks happen
on the network of a DSVM learner, nodes in compromised connections will receive misleading
information, and thus, the classifications in these nodes will be damaged.
In Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks (Figure 2(d)), the attacker can create an adversarial
node in the middle of a connection, talk to both nodes and pretend to be the other node [45]. If
such attacks happen on the network of a DSVM learner, nodes in compromised connections will
receive misleading information, and thus classifications in these nodes will be damaged.
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There are many other network attack models, such as botnet attacks [46] and denial of service
[5], which makes it challenging to analyze and defend attacker’s behaviors. Though distributed
systems improve the efficiency of the learning algorithms, however, the systems becomes more
vulnerable to network attacks. Thus, it is important to design secure distributed ML algorithms
against potential adversaries.
With various types of attack models, a distributed machine learning learner can be vulnerable in
a networked system. Thus, it is important to design secure distributed algorithms against potential
adversaries. Since the learner aims to increase the classification accuracy, while the attacker seeks
to reduce that accuracy, game theory becomes a useful tool to capture the conflicting interests
between the learner and the attacker. The equilibrium of this game allows us to predict the
outcomes of a learner under adversary environments. In the next section, we build a game-theoretic
framework to capture the conflicts between a DSVM learner and an attacker who can modify
training labels and data.
IV. A GAME-THEORETIC MODELING OF ATTACKS
In this section, we use training attacks as an example to illustrate the game-theoretic modeling
of the interactions between a DSVM learner and an attacker. We mainly focus on modelling
training labels attacks, and the training data attacks.
A. Training Labels Attacks
In training labels attacks, the attacker controls a set of nodes Va, and aims at breaking the
training process by flipping training labels yvn to ŷvn =:−yvn. To model the flipped labels at each
node, we first define the matrix of expanded training data X̂v := [[xv1, ...,xvNv,xv1, ...,xvNv ]T , 1̂v]
and the diagonal matrix of expanded labels Ŷv := diag([yv1, ...,yvNv,−yv1, ...,−yvNv]). Note that
the first Nv data and the second Nv data are the same in the matrix of expanded training data.
We further introduce corresponding indicator vector θv := [θv1, ...,θv(2Nv)]
T , where θvn ∈ {0,1},
and θvn+θv(n+Nv) = 1, for n = 1, ...,Nv [38]. θv indicates whether the label has been flipped, for
example, if θvn = 0 for n= 1, ...,Nv, i.e., θv(n+Nv) = 1, then the label of data xvn has been flipped.
Note that θv = [1Tv ,0Tv ]T indicates that there is no flipped label.
Since the learner aims to minimize the classification errors by minimizing the objective function
in Problem (2), the attacker’s intention to maximize classification errors can be captured as
maximizing that objective function. As a result, the interactions of the DSVM learner and the
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attacker can be captured as a nonzero-sum game. Furthermore, since they have same objective
functions with opposite intentions, the nonzero-sum game can be reformulated into a zero-sum
game, which takes the minimax or max-min form [26]:
min
{rv,ωvu}
max
{θv}v∈Va
K ({rv,ωvu} ,{θv}) := 12 ∑
v∈V
rTv Πp+1rv
+VCl ∑
v∈V
θTv
{
1̂v− ŶvX̂vrv
}
+
−VaCa ∑
v∈Va
θTv [0Tv ,1Tv ]T
s.t.
rv = ωvu,ωvn = ru,
θv = [1Tv ,0Tv ]T ;
qTv θv ≤ Qv,
[INv ,INv ]θv = 1v,
θv ⊆ {0,1}2Nv
v ∈ V ,u ∈Bv;
v ∈ Vl;
v ∈ Va;
v ∈ Va;
v ∈ Va.
(7a)
(7b)
(7c)
(7d)
(7e)
(7)
In (7), 1̂v = [1,1, ...,1]T2Nv denotes a vector of size 2Nv, Vl denotes the set of uncompromised
nodes. Note that the first two terms in the objective function and Constraints (7a) are related
to the min-problem for the learner. When θv = [1Tv ,0Tv ]T , i.e., there are no flipped labels, the
min-problem is equivalent to Problem (2). The last two terms in the objective function and
Constraints (7c)-(7e) are related to the max-problem for the attacker. Note that the last term of the
objection function represents the number of flipped labels in compromised nodes. By minimizing
this term, the attacker aims to create the largest impact by flipping the fewest labels. In Constraints
(7c), qv := [0, ..,0,qv(Nv+1), ...,qv(2Nv)]
T , where qv(Nv+n) indicates the cost for flipping the labels
of xvn in node v. This constraint indicates that the capability of the attacker is limited to flip
labels with a boundary Qv at a compromised node v. Constraints (7d) show that the labels in
compromised nodes are either flipped or not flipped.
The Minimax-Problem (7) captures the learner’s intention to minimize the classification errors
with attacker’s intention of maximizing that errors by flipping labels. Problem (7) can be also
written into a max-min form, which captures the attacker’s intention to maximize the classification
errors while the learner tries to minimize it. By minimax theorem, the minimax form in (7) is
equivalent to its max-min form. Thus, solving Problem (7) can be interpreted as finding the
saddle-point equilibrium of the zero-sum game between the learner and the attacker.
Definition 1. Let SL and SA be the action sets for the DSVM learner and the attacker
respectively. Then, the strategy pair ({r∗v ,ω∗vu} ,{θ ∗v }) is a saddle-point equilibrium solution
of the zero-sum game defined by the triple Gz := 〈{L,A} ,{SL,SA} ,K〉, if K ({r∗v ,ω∗vu} ,{θv})≤
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K ({r∗v ,ω∗vu} ,{θ ∗v })≤ K ({rv,ωvu} ,{θ ∗v }) ,∀v ∈ Va, where K is the objective function in Problem
(7).
To solve Problem (7), we construct the best response dynamics for the max-problem and
min-problem separately. The max-problem and the min-problem can be achieved by fixing
{r∗v ,ω∗vu} and {θ ∗v }, respectively. With solving both problems in a distributed way, we achieve
the fully distributed iterations of solving Problem (7) as
θ (t+1)v ∈ argmax
θv
VClθTv {1̂v− ŶvX̂vr(t)v }+−VaCaθTv [0Tv ,1Tv ]T
s.t.
qTv θv ≤ Qv,
[INv ,INv]θv = 1v,
0̂v ≤ θv ≤ 1̂v.
(8a)
(8b)
(8c)
(8)
r(t+1)v ∈ DSVMv,L
(
X̂v, Ŷv,r
(t)
v ,{r(t)u }u∈Bv
∣∣θ (t+1)v ) (9)
Problem (8) is a linear programming problem. Note that integer constraint (7e) has been further
relaxed into (8c). It captures the attacker’s actions in compromised nodes v ∈ Va. Note that each
node can achieve their own θv without transmitting information to other nodes. Problem (9)
comes from the min-part of Problem (7), which can be solved using similar method in [31] with
ADMM [27]. Note that DSVMv,L differs from DSVMv only in the feasible set of the Lagrange
multipliers λv, In DSVMv,L, 0≤ λv ≤VClθ (t+1)v , where θ (t+1)v indicates whether the label has
been flipped, and it comes from the attacker’s Problem (8).
With (8) and (9), the algorithm of solving Problem (7) can be summarized: Each compromised
node computes θv via (8), then compromised and uncompromised nodes compute rv via (6) and
(9), respectively. The iterations will go until convergence.
B. Training Data Attacks
In training data attacks, the attacker has the ability to modify the training data xvn into
x̂vn := xvn−δvn in compromised node v∈ Va. Following a similar method in training label attacks,
we can capture the interactions of the DSVM learner and the attacker as a zero-sum game which
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is shown as follows:
min
{wv,bv}
max
{δvn}
K ({wv,bv} ,{δvn}) := 12 ∑
v∈V
‖wv‖2
+VlCl ∑
v∈Vl
Nv
∑
n=1
[
1−yvn(wTv xvn+bv)
]
+
+VaCl ∑
v∈Va
Nv
∑
n=1
[
1−yvn(wTv (xvn−δvn)+bv)
]
+
−VaCa ∑
v∈Va
Nv
∑
n=1
‖δvn‖0
s.t.
wv = wu,bv = bu,
∑Nvn=1 ‖ δvn ‖2≤Cv,δ ,
∀v ∈ V ,u ∈Bv;
∀v ∈ Va.
(10a)
(10b)
(10)
Note that in the last term, l0 norm ‖x‖0 := |{i : xi 6= 0}| denotes the number of elements which
are changed by the attacker, and deleting it captures the attacker’s intentions to maximizing the
classification errors with changing least number of elements. Constraint (10b) indicates that the
sum of modifiactions in node v are bounded by Cv,δ . Following a similar method in training
labels attacks, we can construct the iterations of solving Problem (10) as follows [22]–[24]:
δ (t+1)v ∈ arg max{δv,sv}VaClr
(t)T
v ÎTp×(p+1)δv−1Tv sv
s.t.
VaCaδv ≤ sv,
VaCaδv ≥−sv,
‖ δv ‖2≤Cv,δ .
(11a)
(11b)
(11c)
(11)
r(t+1)v ∈ DSVMv,D
(
Xv,Yv,r
(t)
v ,{r(t)u }u∈Bv
∣∣δ (t+1)v ) (12)
Note that here δvn has been summed into δv, which captures the modifications in node v.
Constraints (11ab) and the last term of the objective function is the relaxation of the l0 norm.
Note that comparing to DSVMv, DSVMv,D has f
(t+1)
v =VaClδ
(t+1)
v +2α
(t)
v −η∑u∈Uv(r(t)v +r(t)u ),
where δ (t+1)v comes from Problem (11).
In this section, we have modeled the conflicting interests of a DSVM learner and an attacker
using a game-theoretic framework. The interactions of them can be captured as a zero-sum game
where a minimax problem is formulated. The minimization part captures the learner’s intentions
to minimize classification errors, while the maximization part captures the attacker’s intentions
to maximize that errors with making less modifications, i.e., flipping labels and modifying data.
By constructing the min-problem for the learner and max-problem for the attacker separately, the
minimax problem can be solved with the best response dynamics. Furthermore, the min-problem
and max-problem can be solved in a distributed way with Va Sub-Max-Problems (8) and (11),
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and V Sub-Min-Problems (9) and (12). Combing the iterations of solving these problems, we
have the fully distributed iterations of solving the Minimax-Problems (7) and (10). The nature of
this iterative operations provides real-time mechanisms for each node to reacts to its neighbors
and the attacker. Since each node operates its own sub-max-problem and sub-min-problems, the
game between a DSVM learner and an attacker now can be represented by Va sub-games in
compromised nodes. This structure provides us tools to analyze per-node-behaviors of distributed
algorithms under adversarial environments. The transmissions of misleading information r̂v can
be also analyzed via the connections between neighboring games.
V. IMPACT OF ATTACKS
In this section, we present numerical experiments on DSVM under adversarial environments.
We will verify the effects of both the training attacks and the network attacks. The performance
of DSVM is measured by both the local and global classification risks. The local risk at node v
at step t is defined as follows:
R(t)v :=
1
Nv
Nv
∑
n=1
1
2
∣∣∣yvn− y˜(t)vn ∣∣∣, (13)
where yvn is the true label, y˜
(t)
vn is the predicted label, and Nv represents the number of testing
samples in node v. The global risk is defined as follows:
R(t)G :=
1
∑v∈V Nv
∑
v∈V
Nv
∑
n=1
1
2
∣∣∣yvn− y˜(t)vn ∣∣∣, (14)
A higher global risk shows that there are more testing samples being misclassified, i.e., a worse
performance of DSVM.
We define the degree of a node v as the actual number of neighboring nodes |Bv| divided by
the most achievable number of neighbors |V |−1. The normalized degree of a node is always
larger than 0 and less or equal to 1. A higher degree indicates that the node has more neighbors.
We further define the degree of the network as the average degrees of all the nodes.
A. DSVM Under Training Attacks
Recall the attacker’s constraints qTv θv≤Qv in training labels attacks, where qv := [0, ..,0,qv(Nv+1), ...,qv(2Nv)]T
indicates the cost for flipping labels in node v. This constraint indicates that the attacker’s
modifications in node v are bounded by Qv. Without loss of generality, we assume that
qv := [0, ..,0,1, ...,1]T , and thus, the constraint now indicates that the number of flipped labels in
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Fig. 3. ADMM-DSVM under training-label-attacks with |Va|= 4, Q = 30, and Ca = 0.01.
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Fig. 4. ADMM-DSVM under training-label-attacks with |Va|= 1, Q = 30, and Ca = 0.01.
node v are bounded by Qv. We also assume that the attacker has the same Qv = Q and Cv,δ =Cδ
in every compromised node v ∈ Va. Note that we assume that the learner has Cl = 1 and η = 1
in every experiments.
Figures 3-6 show the results when the attacker has different capabilities to flip labels. Each
node contains 40 training samples and 500 testing samples from the same global training dataset
with labels +1 and −1. The data are generated from two-dimensional Gaussian distributions with
mean vectors [1,1] and [2,2], and same covariance matrix [1,0;0,1]. |Va| indicates the number
of compromised nodes. Q indicates the largest number of training samples that can be flipped
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Fig. 6. ADMM-DSVM under training-label-attacks with |Va|= 4, Q = 30, and Ca = 5.
in each node. Ca indicates the cost parameter. Blue filled circles and red filled circles are the
original samples with class +1 and −1, respectively. Blue hollow circles and red hollow circles
are the flipped samples with class +1 and −1, i.e, originally −1 and +1 respectively. We can
see from the figures that when the attacker attacks more nodes, the equilibrium global risk is
higher, and the uncompromised nodes have higher risks (i.e., Figures 3 and 4). When Q is large,
the attacker can flip more labels, and thus the risks are higher (i.e., Figures 3 and 5). When Ca
is large, the cost for the attacker to take an action is too high, and thus there is no impact on the
learner (i.e., Figures 3 and 6). Note that, when the attacker has large capabilities, i.e., larger Q,
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TABLE I
AVERAGE EQUILIBRIUM CLASSIFICATION RISKS (%) OF DSVM USING SPAMBASE DATASET [30] IN NETWORK 1 AND
NETWORK 2.
NET 1 1L 1D 2 2L 2D
RISK 11.6 32.3 42.2 10.6 29.4 39.3
STD 1.6 0.6 2.6 0.6 0.3 1.1
TABLE II
AVERAGE EQUILIBRIUM CLASSIFICATION RISKS (%) OF DSVM USING SPAMBASE DATASET [30] IN NETWORK 3 AND
NETWORK 4.
NET 3 3LA 3LB 3DA 3DB 4 4L 4D
RISK 11.7 29.5 26.9 36.4 34.6 13.5 35.0 47.0
STD 1.5 0.6 1.2 0.9 0.8 1.8 0.9 2.5
smaller Ca or larger Va, even uncompromised nodes, e.g., Node 5, has higher risks.
Tables I and II show the results when the learner trains on different networks. L and D indicate
training labels attacks and training data attacks, respectively. Networks 1 , 2 and 3 have 6
nodes, where each node contains 40 training samples. Network 1 and 2 are balanced networks
with degree 0.4 and 1, respectively. The normalized degrees of each node in Network 3 are
1,0.4,0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2. Network 4 has 12 nodes where each node contains 20 training samples
and has 2 neighbors. In 1L (resp. 1D) and 2L (resp. 2D), the attacker attacks 6 nodes with
Q = 20 (resp. Cδ = 1010). In 3LA (resp. 3DA) and 3LB (resp. 3DB), the attacker attacks 3 (resp.
2) nodes with higher degrees and lower degrees with Q = 20 (resp. Cδ = 1010). In 4L (resp. 4D),
the attacker attacks 12 nodes with Q= 10 (resp. Cδ = 0.5×1010). Comparing 1L (resp. 1D) with
2L (resp. 2D), we can see that network with higher degree has a lower risk when there is an
attacker. From 3LA (resp. 3DA) and 3LB (resp. 3DB), we can tell that the risks are higher when
nodes with higher degrees are under attack. From 1L (resp. 1D) and 4L (resp. 4D), we can see
that network with more nodes has a higher risk when it is under attack. Thus, from Tables I and
II, we can see that network topology plays an important role in the security of the ML learner.
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Fig. 7. ADMM-DSVM under network attacks.
B. DSVM Under Network Attacks
In this subsection, we use numerical experiments to illustrate the impact of network attacks.
In node capture attacks, we assume that the attacker controls a set of nodes Va, and he has the
ability to add noise to the decision variables rv. In Sybil attacks, the attacker can obtain access
to compromised node v ∈ Va, then he generates another malicious node to exchange information
with the compromised node. Instead of sending random information, which can be easily detected,
we assume that he sends a perturbed rv to make compromised node believe that this is a valid
information, where rv comes from the compromised node v. In MITM attacks, we assume that
the attacker creates adversarial nodes in the middle of a connection, and he receives rv from
both sides, but he sends a perturbed rv to the other sides.
In the experiment in Figure 7, we assume that the elements of the noise vector are generated by
a uniform distribution in [0,R], where R indicates the size of the noise. Network 1 and 2 are fully
connected networks with 4 nodes and 8 nodes, respectively. In node capture attacks and Sybil
attacks, the x-axis indicates the number of compromised nodes. The attacker has R = 1,0.01 for
node capture attacks and Sybil attacks, respectively. In MITM attacks, the the x-axis represents
the number of compromised connections, especially, 1 indicates only 1 connection has been
broken, 4 and 8 for network 1 and 2 indicates that all the connections, i.e., 6 and 28 connections,
have been attacked. Note that the attacker has R = 0.05,0.02 for network 1 and 2 in MITM
attacks, respectively . From the figure, we can see that when the attacker attacks more nodes or
connections, the risk becomes larger. Note that, when more than half of the nodes or connections
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are compromised, the DSVM will completely fail, i.e, the classifier is the same as the one that
randomly labels testing data.
VI. DISCUSSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Distributed machine learning (ML) algorithms are ubiquitous but inherently vulnerable to
adversaries. This paper has investigated the security issue of distributed machine learning in
adversarial environments. Possible attack models have been analyzed and summarized into
machine learning type attacks and network type attacks. Their effects on distributed ML have
been studied using numerical experiments.
One major contribution of this work is the investigation of the security threats in distributed
ML. We have shown that the consequence of both ML-type attacks and Network-type attacks
can exacerbate in distributed ML. We have established a game-theoretic framework to capture
the strategic interactions between a DSVM learner and an attacker who can modify training data
and training labels. By using the technique of ADMM, we have developed a fully distributed
iterative algorithms that each node can respond to his neighbors and the adversary in real-time.
The developed framework is broadly applicable to a broad range of distributed ML algorithms
and attack models.
Our work concludes that network topology plays a significant role in the security of distributed
ML. We have recognized that a balanced network with fewer nodes and a higher degree is less
vulnerable to the attacker who controls the whole system. We have shown that nodes with higher
degrees can cause more severe damages to the system when under attack. Also, network-type
attacks can increase the risks of the whole networked systems even though the attacker only add
small noise to a small subset of nodes.
Our work is a starting point to explore the security of distributed ML. In the future, we aim to
extend the game-theoretic framework to capture various attack models and different distributed
ML algorithms. We have proposed four defense methods in [25] to protect DSVM against training
data attacks, and we intend to explore other defense strategies for distributed ML by leveraging
techniques developed in robust centralized algorithms [7], [37] and detection methods [11], [47].
Furthermore, we could use cyber insurance to mitigate the cyber data risks from attackers [48],
[49].
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